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Early Synthetic Prototyping (ESP) is a new concept in which capability and 
material developers use an online game to crowdsource ideas from online players in order 
to increase viable synthetic prototypes. In entertainment games, players often create 
videos of their game play to share with other players to demonstrate how to complete a 
segment of a game. This thesis explores similar self-recorded videos of ESP game play 
and determines if they provide useful data to capability and material developers that can 
influence the early design process, or if the videos affect the ESP process itself. 
The study shows that user videos affect player behavior as well as increase 
engagement and entertainment for the players, which serves to maintain a large player 
population essential to ESP success. The exact reasons for increased engagement and 
entertainment are unclear and are topics for further investigation. These results are 
important to ESP developers because if ESP game developers can increase the 
engagement and fun in playing their games, it will increase participation and willingness 
to contribute ideas and strategies with other players. The increase in contributions and 
participation will then lead to an increase in the number of early prototypes that can be 
analyzed and potentially used.  
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For the first time in 40 years, the Army has updated its operating concept, which 
is a shift from how to “fight, outnumber, and win” to how to “win in a complex world” 
(Perkins, 2014). In order to win in a complex world, the Army will need to not only 
anticipate future threats but also innovate in order to ensure its forces are able to bring 
overmatching capabilities to bear on it enemies. (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 
Command [TRADOC], 2014). One way the Army seeks to improve and speed up its 
innovation is with Early Synthetic Prototyping (ESP). 
ESP is a new concept in which capability and material developers use an online 
game to crowdsource ideas from online players in order to increase the viability of 
synthetic prototypes. One current trend in online game communities is the creation and 
sharing of self-recorded game play videos. Since ESP will be an online game, users may 
create self-recorded videos of their game play for other users to watch. This thesis seeks 
to answer the following questions with regard to user created videos in an ESP game 
community: 
1. Is it reasonable to expect ESP game players to create and narrate game 
play video after action report (AAR)s? 
2. Does availability of game play video AARs increase user feedback and 
participation in ESP game play? 
3. Will game play video AARs provide useful feedback to developers? 
4. Will game play video AARs provide useful information to other players 
and enhance the game play? 
In order to answer these questions, the author conducted a human-in-the-loop 
study with two groups playing an ESP-style military game. The first group conducted a 
mission and then recorded a game play video. The second group watched the videos, and 
then played the game. 
Results of the study show that the user videos affect the players’ behavior as well 
as created a more entertaining environment for the players than one without videos. The 
exact reasons why the videos increased the fun platers had within the environment are 
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unknown and future studies should further investigate the cause. These results are 
important to ESP developers because if ESP game developers can increase the fun in 
their games, it should increase overall participation and buy-in of their players. (Vogt, 
Megiveron,  & Smith, 2015). The increase in buy-in and participation should lead to 
more opportunities for developing and testing. 
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Since the early 1980s and prior to the newly published Army Operating Concept 
(AOC), the United States Army used the Airland Battle Doctrine as a blueprint for how it 
would equip an Army designed to fit a known enemy on a known terrain. (Perkins 2014). 
Over the past decade, the operational environment that the Army fights in has changed 
and thus, the operating concept has changed as well. According to the new AOC, “the 
environment the Army will operate in is unknown. The enemy is unknown, the location is 
unknown, and the coalitions involved are unknown” (TRADOC, 2014, p. iii). The title of 
the new AOC and the problem the Army is now faced with solving is how to “Win in a 
Complex World” (TRADOC, 2014).  
In the Army’s newly published AOC, “complexity is defined as an environment 
that is not only unknown, but unknowable and constantly changing. The Army cannot 
predict who it will fight, where it will fight, and with what coalition it will fight” 
(TRADOC, 2014, p. iii). This new operating concept will require the institutional Army 
to be more adaptive and innovative in its mission to equip and train the operational Army 
“to ensure that Army forces are manned, trained, and equipped to overmatch enemies in 
order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative” (p. iv). 
The Army defines “overmatch” as the “application of capabilities or use of tactics 
in a way that renders an adversary unable to respond effectively” (TRADOC, 2014, p. 9). 
As technology proliferation increases, the adversarial forces that the Army will face can 
diminish the Army’s technological advantage in two ways. They can either use new 
technologies to increase their own or mitigate the Army’s capabilities. This could in turn 
then lead to either an enemy overmatch or the loss of the Army’s overmatch. The Army 
aims to prevent this loss of overmatch by rapidly developing new capabilities. Therefore, 
as the need to speed up the development of new capabilities to field to the operating force 
becomes increasingly important, the institutional Army seeks to use innovation to solve 
this problem (TRADOC, 2014). 
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Innovation is a key tenet of the Army and the one that it seeks to use to maintain 
overmatch against existing and potential adversaries. TRADOC describes innovation in 
the Army Operation Concept as  
the result of critical and creative thinking and the conversion of new ideas 
into valued outcomes. Innovation drives the development of new tools or 
methods that permit Army forces to anticipate future demands, stay ahead 
of determined enemies, and accomplish the mission. Innovation is 
particularly important in organizations that develop capabilities as well as 
those that train, equip, and sustain forces. (TRADOC, 2014, p. 22) 
From this critical thinking, the Army determines the needed capabilities to equip 
the future forces. Such thinking also provides the answers to how tomorrow’s leaders will 
employ future and existing capabilities to accomplish a multitude of missions in various 
environments (TRADOC, 2014). Formally, this critical thinking supports the Army’s 
Warfighting Challenge No. 4:  
How to maintain an agile institutional Army that ensures combat 
effectiveness of the total force, supports other services, fulfills DOD 
[Department of Defense] and other agencies’ requirements, ensures 
quality of life for Soldiers and families, and possesses the capability to 
surge (mobilize) or expand (strategic reserve) the active Army. 
(TRADOC, 2014, p. 32). 
Currently, the Army uses an acquisition process in which the capability developer 
conducts a needs analysis to determine if any gaps exist in the current and future forces 
capabilities needed to accomplish their required missions (TRADOC, 2014). If any gaps 
exist, the capability developers identify them and develop the requirements necessary to 
fill them. Then, they give these requirements to material developers to build the system 
and field it to the operational Army. This process utilizes very few capability developers 
and produces very few prototypes for testing. The Army could improve this process by 
increasing the number of critical thinkers participating in the design process, which in 
turn should also increase the number of viable prototypes for future testing. One way the 
Army seeks to leverage innovation and improve the acquisition process in this manner is 
to use Early Synthetic Prototyping. (ESP).  
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ESP is a new initiative from the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) 
that seeks increase the amount of critical thinkers participating in the design of future 
capabilities with the use of an online military themed game. This game will allow users 
outside of the traditional capability and material development community to participate in 
the design process. ESP will allow Soldiers from across the Army to test and evaluate 
synthetic prototypes and then provide feedback to developers (Vogt, 2016). The Army 
will leverage innovation by crowdsourcing ideas and evaluations from thousands of 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The Army is looking to ESP to not only increase the number of viable prototypes, 
but also produce feedback from the actual users early in the design process. The main 
vehicle for this feedback will be the use of an online game and an online community. 
Therefore, the focus of this thesis concerns how to best facilitate feedback from players 
in a form useful to materiel developers. One of the most recent trends in online gaming is 
the creation and sharing of ideas using self-recorded game videos. Players of 
entertainment games often create videos of their game play to demonstrate how they 
solved a problem or completed a mission. These videos are then posted on public 
websites for sharing. If players are willing to create and share videos for commercial 
entertainment games, would ESP players similarly create videos in an ESP game 
environment? 
A. EARLY SYNTHETIC PROTOTYPING 
According to ARCIC,  
initial research indicates that computer based gaming environments can 
provide a cost-effective and engaging means to enable Soldiers and 
leaders across the Army to explore future capabilities, develop solutions to 
associated challenges, provide related recommendations, and collaborate 
with one another to inform concept and capability developers. (Vogt, 
2016, p. 1) 
1. What Is ESP? 
ESP is a new concept the United States Army is currently exploring. The two 
primary agencies conducting the research are ARCIC and the United States Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]) 
(Richmond, n.d.). According to Vogt (2016), the Early Synthetic Prototyping Project 
Lead for ARCIC, the Army has divided the development of ESP into four areas of effort: 
collaboration, feedback and game analytics, the game environment, distribution and 
network capability, and research.  
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The largest effort in the development of ESP is the development of collaborative 
environment. The collaborative environment will provide “the means for Soldiers to 
provide explicit/qualitative feedback through surveys, polls, discussion boards as well as 
implicit/quantitative feedback through automated game analytic tools to identify trends in 
game play” (Vogt, 2016, p. 2). The next effort is the development of the game 
environment. Many military-based games are available within the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and as commercial-off-the-shelf solutions; however, since the goal of an ESP 
game is much different, most, if not all, of the other solutions available will not be 
suitable for an ESP game (2016). An ESP game will need to collect data unique to the 
acquisition and material development process. This will require the Army to build two 
types of games. The first game will be a first person shooter game. It will evaluate how 
Soldiers use and interact with individual systems. The second game will be a strategy 
game played at a higher echelon to evaluate organization and employment of future 
systems (2016). The third effort for the development of ESP is distribution and network 
capability. This effort focuses on the need “to deliver and host the game environment(s) 
and the feedback, collaboration and game analytic tools” (p. 2). Finally, the last effort is 
research. Since ESP is a new concept, the Army will need to collaborate with both 
industry and academic institutions to ensure that the body of knowledge with regard to 
ESP is continuously growing (2016). 
ESP essentially seeks to improve not only the Army’s acquisition process but also 
doctrinal and organizational development processes by making two major changes to the 
current acquisition process. First, it seeks to increase the number of viable design points 
by using crowdsourcing to develop and evaluate virtual prototypes. Second, it aims to put 
the soldier in the middle of the design process. In its final state 
ESP is envisioned to provide a synthetic game environment where 
engineers and concept developers can rapidly model multiple potential 
capabilities/prototypes. Soldiers, on and off duty, are able engage in 
various scenarios specifically designed to elicit feedback that address 
research questions associated with the Army Warfighting Challenges as it 
relates to doctrine, organization, and materiel solutions. (Vogt, 2016, p. 1) 
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Currently, the Army’s system for material development does not include the 
Solider until the testing phase of new equipment. This system allows for very little 
collaboration between all stakeholders involved in the acquisition process. Using ESP for 
development, ESP brings the Soldier to the center of the process and collaboration 
between all agencies is possible not only through the ESP collaboration environment, but 
also from the game metrics specifically designed to inform developers on the evaluation 
of proposed systems (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1.  Current Development System versus the ESP System. Source: 
Vogt, Darken, McGroarty, Smith, Perriello, and Phillips (2014). 
 




Also, the current design method used by the Army does not gather feedback from 
actual users until late in the development timeline, when actual prototypes are available 
for testing (see Figure 2). This is expensive and limiting. ESP seeks to enable an 
environment in which soldiers can provide feedback based on virtual prototypes. Since 
these virtual prototypes are available much earlier in the development timeline, the 
changes are much cheaper. ESP seeks to bring “Soldiers, scientist, engineers and concept 
developers into a common environment to rapidly assess, modify, and experiment with 
future equipment—without bending a single piece of metal. The core objective of ESP is 
to transition ideas and concepts from a good idea on a dry erase board to the game 
environment that thousands of soldiers across the Army, on and off duty are able to 
assess. This assessment will simultaneously inform science technology investments as 
well as inform doctrine, organization and training/education development” (Vogt, 
2013, p. 1). 
2. Previous ESP Projects 
The Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Engineered Resilient Systems 
sponsored the first ESP project in December 2013. This pilot study’s objective was to 
examine the feasibility of using gaming a as a means to evaluate future capabilities. This 
study resulted in a thesis experiment conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (Vogt, 
2016). The study sought to answer the following questions: “What feedback can be 
gathered from [ESP] game play” and “Would that feedback be valuable” (Murray, 2014, 
p. xix). The results of the study concluded that information collected from game play in 
an ESP environment is both relevant and useful (Murray, 2014). 
In December of 2014, the Army Modeling and Simulation Office (AMSO) 
sponsored another ESP study. In this study conducted by ARCIC, the researchers focused 
on two major questions. First, they wanted to find out what would motivate soldiers to 
play ESP games in their off time. Second, they sought to determine if any of the feedback 
and metrics collected from their pilot study were useful to capability and material 
developers. Results of the study indicated that a large majority of soldiers wanted to 
participate and play ESP games if they knew that the Army was using their feedback to 
 9 
develop future weapon systems. Furthermore, the researchers also felt that the quality of 
the feedback received, although through surveys and discussions, was valuable (Vogt et 
al., 2015). 
B. GAMING COMMUNITIES AND THE “LET’S PLAY” PHENOMENON 
Video games are more popular now than ever and that means big business to the 
game industry. Over 155 million Americans play video games, more than half of the 
households in America have a dedicated game system, and total consumer spending on 
video games in the U.S. exceeded 20 Billion dollars in 2015 (Entertainment Software 
Association [ESA], 2015). Gaming numbers may be even higher for Soldiers. One recent 
study suggested that over 76 percent of the Army’s Soldiers who would participate in 
ESP games already play video games. Over 70 percent of these soldiers play at least two 
hours a week and over 50 percent of them play over ten hours (Vogt et al., 2015). 
Compare that with recent statistic from the ESA that only 42 percent of Americans play 
video games more than three hours per week (ESA, 2015). These statistics suggest not 
only that the average Soldier plays more video games than the average American, but 
also that the Army has a prime environment in which to create a community of ESP 
players. 
Creation and management of a gaming community in which players will be able 
to connect with other players and developers are paramount to the success of the ESP 
program. These communities will be the environment in which players will both share 
their experiences and provide feedback. These communities will also allow developers to 
both actively and passively collect the desired metrics on the various prototypes tested. 
(Vogt, 2016)  
While the ESP developers will seek to create and manage this online community, 
history has shown that most likely this community will take on a personality of its own. 
The emergence of gamming channels on YouTube is one such an example of players 
seeking an area to collaborate as well as watch other, more skillful players (Iannitti, 
2015). While this may sound foreign to people who do not play games or identify as 
gamers, the numbers show that this phenomenon is becoming more and more 
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mainstream. The number one channel on YouTube in both subscribers and views (see 
Figure 3) is a 25-year -old gamer from Sweden named Felix Kjellberg, but goes by the 
screen name of PewDiePie (McConnell, 2014). Not only is Kjellberg No. 1 in terms of 
subscribers and video views, he is the No. 1 video creator on YouTube, earning over $12 
million in 2015 alone (Berg, 2015). 
Figure 3.  Top YouTube Video Views and Subscriber Channels. Adapted 
from SocialBlade (2016). 
  
 
So, why do gamers flock to watch other gamers play video games? According to 
Nick Iannitti, Digital and Social Media Strategist at Fuel Entertainment, this behavior is 
nothing we have not seen before. Iannitti says that the gamers that are creating videos are 
“simply following the preexisting laws of nature in something called Emergent Behavior. 
We can observe emergent behavior in everything from ant colonies to the largest of 
cities. The premise of emergent behavior is that we are all connected through networks 
(both online & offline) and that we naturally self-organize across our networks to form 
higher levels of order” (Iannitti, 2015, para. 7). In essence, gamers are looking for other 
gamers who share their interests. Thanks to advances in technology and the emergence of 
the Internet and YouTube, these communities can now connect anywhere, at any time. 
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What exactly is a YouTube game channel like “Let’s Play” (LP)? Essentially, LP 
is an online forum where “folks play through a game, continually document their 
progress via photos or video, and add their own commentary to complete the package. 
This content is typically posted in message board threads, which draw in an enthusiastic 
audience that’s eager to discuss the game, contribute suggestions, and even concoct their 
own creative works directly related to the title in question. The result: a highly interactive 
community that’s created hundreds upon hundreds of hours of entertainment” (Mackey, 
2011, para. 2). Mackey’s description of LP looks quite similar to LTC Vogt’s description 
of what an ESP game will provide. Vogt states that an ESP community will be “the 
means for Soldiers to provide explicit/qualitative feedback through surveys, polls, 
discussion boards as well as implicit/quantitative feedback through automated game 
analytic tools to identify trends in game play” (Vogt, 2016, p. 2). It makes sense that ESP 
developers need to be concerned that their players may seek other forums for 
collaboration, especially if the ESP developers can produce an ESP game that is near the 
fun level of other commercial games that ESP developers will be competing with for 
Soldiers’ time. The issue of ESP game players collaborating outside of the ESP 
community could mean a loss of valuable game metrics if the information that users share 
in these types of forums is useful to both developers.  
  
 12 
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III. METHODOLOGY, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A human-in-the-loop experiment which was approved the NPS Institutional 
Review Board, protocol number NPS20160038.0 was conducted at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulations (MOVES) 
Institute. The experiment was a case study to determine how effective self-recorded AAR 
videos of users playing ESP games are in the collection of feedback and the usefulness of 
the information gained to developers. The experiment utilized the Army’s Virtual 
Battlespace 3 (VBS3) game to simulate an ESP-like game. VBS3 is a simulation training 
solution develop by Bohemia Interactive and used by the United States Army for 
collective training and mission rehearsals (Bohemia Interactive Simulations, n.d.). 
Researchers chose VBS3 as the software for this experiment to simulate an ESP game 
because it was readily available and flexible enough to create an adequate scenario for 
video creation and narration. 
A. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to analyzing the use and effects of video 
AARs in ESP game play systems. Information derived from ESP games for design and 
development purposes can run the gamut, and therefore other collection techniques will 
not be considered. Also, creation and management of the online game community itself 
would be a very difficult task; therefore, this thesis will assume that of such a community 
already exists. A surrogate will be provided locally. 
B. EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
The experiment utilized two groups of participants. Researchers recruited 
participants for both groups and randomly assigned participants to either to Group 1 or 
Group 2.  
1. Participants 
The experiment required 40 participants and took place over 10 sessions with four 
participants per session. Researchers solicited participants via flyer’s distributed in 
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person and via the NPS muster page daily announcements. The target audience for the 
experiment was NPS students with military experience who regularly play video games. 
However, due to volunteer turn out, experimenters accepted participation from all 
respondents. 
Participants formed two teams, either red or blue. For each session, during the 
initial in brief and introduction, the researcher queried all four participants to determine 
which players had the most video game experience. Based on that knowledge, the 
experimenter divided the participants to balance the teams with regard to game 
experience. However, it should be noted that team balance is not a key issue here since 
“performance” itself was not measured. Our interest here was in behavior and strategy 
employed, not in how well the team played the scenario. 
The target audience for this study was military gamers; however, a few factors 
limited the ability to ensure that each participant was the ideal volunteer. First, the time 
constraints forced researchers to conduct the study over a three-week period. Second, this 
study required each session to have four volunteers. These two requirements made it 
difficult to find enough target volunteers with similar schedule availability to conduct the 
experiments. See Table 1 for participant demographics. 
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Table 1.   Participant Demographics 
 
 
2. Scenario Design 
The scenario for each session was the same. The red team occupied an abandoned 
prison and held an American journalist hostage. The red team’s mission was to protect 
the hostage and defend their position until a red quick reaction force (QRF) could arrive. 
The red QRF would arrive 8–10 minutes after either the initial engagement or when red 
forces spotted blue forces. The blue team’s mission was to move from their release point 
to the prison, secure the prisoner, and then move to the pick zone (PZ) for extraction. 
The red team consisted of four opposing forces (OPFOR) soldiers. Two red 
participants played two of the four soldiers, and the game’s artificial intelligence (AI) 
controlled the other two. The red team could place the two AI soldiers in either the 
towers to provide overwatch of the prison or as roving guards to patrol the perimeter of 
the prison complex. The red team would win if they either defeated the blue force attack 
or prevented the blue forces from securing the prisoner until their QRF arrived. 
The blue team consisted of four U.S. Army Soldiers. Two blue participants played 
two of the four soldiers and the game’s AI controlled the other two. The blue force 
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commander, however, did have the ability to control the AI soldiers by using the 
commands within the game. The blue team won the game if they successfully secured the 
prisoner and reached the PZ before red QRF forces arrived. 
3. Group 1 Experiment 
For Group 1, participants began by completing a few tutorials and a practice 
scenario. The tutorials taught the users basic movements and game functions needed for 
the game scenario. After the tutorials, users conducted a rehearsal scenario where they 
had the opportunity to practice the execution of the various controls needed to complete 
the mission. After the rehearsal scenario, the moderator gave each team a mission brief.  
After this brief, each team had 5 minutes to plan their mission. The blue team had 
to choose one of three possible release points where they would begin their mission. The 
red team had to choose one of two defense strategies, either roving guards or towers. 
Once the game was complete, the experiment moderators assisted each user in the 
creation of an AAR video. This video used actual game play footage and a planning map 
overview for the users to narrate and analyze their execution of the mission and the 
decisions they made. 
The following questions were used to guide the red team participants in creating 
their AAR video. All questions were not answered in all videos, but this was intended to 
ensure that each video contained similar information that would be relevant to a 
subsequent player. 
 
1. Why did you pick your defense course of action (COA) (rovers versus 
guards)? 
2. What was your planned scheme of maneuver for defense? 
3. Did anything prevent you from executing your planned mission? 
4. Was your mission a success? Why or why not? 
5. What if anything would you do different? 
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Similarly, the blue team videos addressed the following questions: 
 
1. Why did you pick your release point? 
2. What was your planned scheme of maneuver? 
3. Did anything prevent you from getting to the objective, if so what? 
4. What happed at the objective? 
5. Was your mission a success? Why or why not? 
6. What if anything would you do different? 
 
Participants also filled out a short demographic survey as well as post task survey. 
Once Group 1 completed recording all 20 videos, the researchers reviewed and 
ranked the videos based on both content and presentation. This was an artificial ranking 
but it is what players would expect from an actual community site that would rank videos 
based on viewer feedback. Since this study did not have an actual online community to 
rank the videos, there needed to be a way to present the videos to the second group along 
with some feedback about which were the best ones. In practice, players would expect a 
game-based social network where users give “likes” and add comments to the best videos 
and the best videos will have the most “views.” The rankings were important and they 
ensured that the videos the second group viewed were the most engaging. For this 
experiment, the actual ranking of AAR videos is not important because our focus was on 
the affect the videos had on subsequent players who viewed the videos. 
Once all the videos had been ranked, the top two from both the blue and red sides 
were chosen for the test group to watch. However, further analysis of the videos after 
ranking revealed that all of the red videos utilized the red defense of guard towers, and 
none of the blue videos utilized the strategy of starting at release point 2. Since the goal 
of the experiment was to see if the Group 1 videos affected the behavior of Group 2 (the 
dependent group), researchers created two artificial videos to add to the set of videos for 
Group 2 to view. One video was a scenario in which the red forces would use a roving 
guard strategy. The other video was a scenario in which the blue forces would start out 
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from release point 2. With a set of AAR videos covering the full breadth of strategic 
options, the study could determine if the additional information caused players in Group 
2 to differ from their decisions in both mission planning and during the operation.  
4. Group 2 Experiment 
Researchers solicited and organized Group 2 in the same manner as Group 1. In 
addition, moderators screened users to ensure that no one who participated in the first 
group participated in the second group. After the formation of teams, moderators gave 
Group 2 the same opportunities and time as Group 1 to complete tutorials and a practice 
scenario. After familiarization, the moderators administered the exact same mission brief 
to Group 2 that they gave to Group 1. After this brief, the moderators allowed Group 2 to 
watch about 15 minutes of three short AAR videos from Group 1 completing and 
narrating their missions. After watching the videos, moderators gave Group 2 the same 
planning time as Group 1 before starting the mission.  
At the end of their mission, the second group completed a short survey about their 
experience. The questions in their survey included the following:  
 
1. How much did the videos influence your decisions in either mission 
planning or during the operation? 
2. How useful did you think the videos were and would you recommend that 
other users watch them? 
3. How much did the videos contribute to your overall success or failure in 
completing the mission? 
 
C. RESULTS 
The first metric collected from each scenario was mission success. Blue teams 
succeeded in the mission if they could get the hostage from the prison complex to the PZ 
for extraction. Red teams succeed if they prevented the hostage and blue forces from 
getting to the PZ. Moderators briefed both sides that if either team harms the hostage, that 
team would lose; however, this never happened during the experiment. The results of 
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Group 1 produced four blue winning sessions and one red winning session, and Group 2 
produced four red winning sessions and one blue winning session (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4.  Blue versus Red Winners by Group. 
 
 
In the scenario, the blue forces had to choose either release point 1, 2 or 3. In the 
first group, blue players chose release point 1 four times and only choose release point 3 
once. Group 1 blue forces never selected release point 2. Group 2 only selected release 
point 1 once and selected release point 2 and 3 twice each (see Figure 5). In discussion 
with the Group 1 players after the session, all of the players that chose release point 1 did 
so because they felt it offered the most cover and concealment. 
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Figure 5.  Blue versus Red Winners by Group. 
 
 
The red team had the option to choose one of two defense strategies. The two 
options were defending with two AI soldiers positioned in guard towers or two AI 
soldiers assigned roving guard routes. Group 1 only chose the guard tower option and 
Group 2 chose the guard tower option all but once. In discussion with the red teams that 
chose the guard tower option, all stated that the reason was to give them advanced notice 
of blue forces arriving (see Figure 6). 





After each mission, moderators gave all participants post task surveys to fill out. 
The post task surveys only contained three questions that common for both groups: 
 
1. On a scale of 1–5 (1 being “bad” and 5 being “great”) How would you rate 
your game experience? 
2. On a scale of 1–5 (1 being “not fun” and 5 being “fun”) How would you 
rate how fun the game was? 
3. Would you create videos for other players to watch? Yes/No 
 
The average score for game experience for Group 1 was 3.7, and the average 
score for Group 2 was 4.1. The average score for how fun the game was for Group 1 was 
3.8 and the average score for Group 2 was 4.5 (see Figure 7). The game experience 
means between Group 1 and Group 2 did not have any significant statistically difference 
(see Figure 9). However, there was a statistically significant difference between Group 1 
and Group 2 with regard to the mean scores on questions two. Analysis showed that at a 
95 percent confidence level, the amount of fun that Group 2 recorded was higher than 
what Group 1 had (see Figure 8). 
Figure 7.  Blue versus Red Winners by Group. 
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Figure 8.  Analysis of Means for Question 2—Rate Your Game Experience. 
 




Analyis of Question 3 revealed that about in total 72.5 percent of the participants 
said that they would create videos for others to watch. Group 1 participants answered yes 
75 percent and Group 2 answered yes 70 percent. Threre was no statisicical difference in 
the two groups scores (see Figures 10 and 11). 
Figure 10.  Mosaic Plot—Would You Create Videos? By Group. 
 




Group 2’s survey asked the Group 2 participants eight additional questions that 
related directly to the videos that they watched before playing their session. The 
questions were: 
 
1. On a scale of 1–5 (1 being “not useful” and 5 “very useful”) How would 
you rate how useful the videos were to your experience? 
2. Would you recommend watching user videos for other participants? Yes/
No 
3. Do you feel that the user videos influenced your decisions during mission 
planning? Yes/No 
4. If yes, rate the influence on a scale of 1–5 (1 being “little influence” and 5 
“highly influenced”) 
5. Do you feel that the user videos influenced your decisions during the 
operation? Yes/No 
6. If yes, rate the influence on a scale of 1–5 (1 being “little influence” and 5 
“highly influenced”) 
7. Do you feel that the user videos contributed to your success or failure of 
the operation? Yes/No 
8. If yes, rate the contribution on a scale of 1–5 (1 being “little contribution” 
and 5 “high contribution”)  
 
On a scale of 1–5, Group 2 rated the videos as a 4.25 in terms of helpfulness and 100 
percent of the participants said that they would recommend to other players to watch the 
videos (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  Usefulness of Videos and Would You Recommend Them. 
 
 
Ninety-five percent of Group 2 participants said that the videos affected their 
mission planning and rated the effect on mission planning as 3.74 (see Figure 13). 
Figure 13.  Effects of Videos on Mission Planning. 
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In contrast, only 55 percent of Group 2 participants said that the videos affected 
their decision during the mission. Those who said it did rated the effects as 3.74 out of 5. 
(see Figure 14). The effects on mission planning versus decisions during the operation 
showed that the videos affected Group 2 participants during mission planning 40 percent 
more than they affected decision during the operation. The score with regard to how 
much the video affected both were very similar (see Figure 15).  
Figure 14.  Effects of Videos during the Operation. 
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1. Artificial Online Community 
Creating an actual online community of ESP game players to conduct this study 
was outside of this study’s scope and resources. Therefore, Group 1’s primary purpose in 
this study was to provide the video narration for the researchers to use to create an 
artificial online community. This artificial online community would be the environment 
for the second group to play in. In a real online community, users would rank and score 
videos based on the their content and usefulness, and it would be easy for the other users 
to find to the best and most watched videos. Given the time constraint for the experiment, 
Group 2 did not have the necessary time to watch all ten full-length videos created by 
Group 1. Therefore, the researchers needed to choose the best videos and then edit each 
video selected from roughly 15 minutes to 3–5 minutes. This was done by speeding up 
the playback of the video in between the voice narration parts of the video. 
However, Group 1 had a secondary role in this experiment. Because they did not 
receive any AAR preview prior to executing the missions, their strategic and tactical 
decisions were used as a baseline for how players might approach the scenario without 
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any opportunity to see how others attempted it before them. See Section 5 for further 
discussion on this point. 
Another issue that creating an artificial online community presented was the lack 
of variety in videos created by Group 1. Group 1 conducted five separate sessions in total 
and in those five sessions, the Group 1 blue team selected release point 1 for its starting 
point 4 times and release point 3 only once. Not one Group 1 team selected release point 
2 as a starting position. The Group 1 red teams followed suit and selected the tower 
defense strategy over the roving guard strategy each time as well. After the Group 1 
session, the selection of videos chosen for Group 2 to watch did not have any release 
point 1 or roving guard strategies examples for Group 2 to watch. In order to present 
Group 2 with a variety of videos, two artificial videos were made, one to illustrate an 
example of release point 2 and one to illustrate an example of defending with roving 
guards. Due to the small sample size for video selection coupled with the fact that the 
primary focus for Group 2 was how they would react to the videos, adding two artificial 
videos was a change that the researchers felt was warranted.  
One outcome from presenting Group 2 with a variety of videos that showed 
multiple ways to complete the mission was the Group 2 blue forces and red forces 
showed more variability in their strategy selection than Group 1. However, due to such a 
small sample size of videos and sessions, this data cannot support any conclusions 
without additional research. 
2. Winning Percentage—Group 1 versus Group 2 
The blue team would win the scenario if it successfully moved the hostage to the 
PZ before the red team’s QRF arrived. For the red team, preventing the blue forces from 
reaching the PZ with the hostage and ensuring the safety of the hostage constituted a 
successful mission. Group 1 produced four out of five blue winners. Group 1’s blue team 
used release point 1 three times successfully and release point 3 once successfully. In the 
second group of trials, the blue force was only successful once. The lone successful run 
from blue forces in the second group originated at release point 2 and was against a red 
force utilizing the towers. In the other four sessions in Group 2, the Group 2 red teams 
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won each time. The major difference between the red forces in Group 1 and Group 2 was 
the use of a heavy machine gun inside the prison. This was a strategy that was 
highlighted in one of the videos and all of the red teams in Group 2 adapted to this 
strategy. The adoption of this strategy was primary responsible for the shift in red’s 
winning percentage from 20 percent to 80 percent, thus providing further evidence that 
the AARs did affect subsequent player strategy and behavior. 
Blue forces may have redistributed their starting points due to watching the 
videos, changing from starting at release point 1 four times and release point 2 once, to 
starting at release point 1 once, release point 2 and 3 twice each. Anecdotal evidence 
revealed that most Group 1 blue forces chose release point 1 because they felt it offered 
the most cover and concealment. Group 2’s blue forces, however were able to watch two 
successful videos in which the cover and concealment afforded to the blue forces from 
release point 1 did not outweigh the easier access to the objective that release point 2 and 
release point 3 offered. In fact, even though the blue forces were less successful in the 
second group, it was not due to the release point that they selected. In Group 2,blue 
forces reached the prison complex in all of the scenarios with more combat power than 
they did in Group 1. As stated earlier, the biggest reason for the shift was due to Group 
2’s red forces use of a heavy machine gun at the objective. Group 2’s blue forces also 
utilized successful examples they viewed from Group 1’s videos such as use of an AT4 
rocket launcher on the guard towers and utilization of easier access points in and out of 
the objective.  
3. Increase in “Fun” Level for Group 2 
As stated earlier, Group 2 reported a statistically significant difference in the level 
of fun that it had compared to what Group 1 reported. The data collected from this 
experiment does not point to any underlying reasons for this shift; however, future 
experiments should examine a few hypotheses. First, it may be that playing the game 
after you have seen others play creates more of a competitive game environment. Second, 
it could be that after the Group 2 players saw their peers from Group 1 complete the 
mission successfully and report how they did it, it gave more incentive for Group 2 
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players to not only complete the mission as well, but do even better than the previous 
group. Another reason may be that watching videos gave Group 2 more context about the 
mission and highlighted more options that Group 1 was not able to fully see. This added 
information and context may have made the game more fun for Group 2. Finally, the 
reason for the difference in the fun levels between the two groups could be that creating 
the videos was less fun that watching them. Since Group 1 had to create the videos, they 
recorded lower fun levels than the group who did not have to create them. Although it is 
unlikely that the video creation decreased Group 1’s fun level significantly since both 
Group 1 and Group 2 recorded very similar game experience scores, the effects of 
creating videos on the fun level cannot be ruled out.  
4. Usefulness of Videos 
Group 2 unanimously responded that it would recommend watching the videos to 
other participants. This number is hard to ignore and evidence shows both qualitatively 
and quantitatively that watching the videos made Group 2 better at completing the 
mission than Group 1. Compare this number with the fact that 95percent of Group 2’s 
players said the video affected mission planning; one can easily infer that Group 2 feels 
that other users should use these videos for their mission planning as well.  
Furthermore, if the AAR videos were useful to Group 2 players in exploring 
options and making decisions about how to execute the mission, then it also suggests that 
an analyst (e.g., acquisition, operations) would also be able to extract the same useful 
information from the AAR videos. This implies that when an analyst designs an ESP 
scenario to answer a specific question, he must ensure that the scenario forces the game 
player to solve a problem exactly on that point so that it will be addressed in the resulting 
AAR video. 
5. Effects on Mission Planning Decisions versus Operational Decisions 
Ninety-five percent of Group 2’s players responded that the videos affected their 
mission planning while only 55percent said it affected their actual decision during the 
game. The difference in these proportions suggests that while the Group 2 players used 
other players’ experience for planning, once the mission began, what they saw and 
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learned was not as valuable as the information gathered as the mission unfolded. This is 
understandable since the mission they completed was against other human players and 
therefore, the videos could not predict exactly what the Group 2 players would face. It 
also suggests that during mission planning, it is easier to consider other players’ opinions, 
but once the game begins, the players are now in reactionary mode, without time to 
consider the videos. It may also suggest that the AARs were especially effective in 
planning such that operational decisions went generally according to expectations thereby 
requiring little input from the AARs. In either case, we are encouraged that the AARs 
were indeed useful and did provide valuable assistance. 
6. Research Questions 
The experiment in this thesis answered three of the four research questions 
proposed with quantifiable data. Researchers relied on qualitative evidence collected 
from the Group 1 videos to answer the one question not supported by quantifiable data 
collected from surveys or game play.  
a. Is It Reasonable to Expect ESP Game Players to Create and Narrate 
Game Play Video AARs? 
Survey data suggest that a large majority of players who participated in the study 
would create and narrate game play videos. Overall 72.5 percent of the participants said 
that they would. Although the sample size is too small to reasonably predict how many 
ESP players would actually produce videos, the results suggest that a good portion 
would. 
b. Does Availability of Game Play Video AARs Increase User Feedback 
and Participation in ESP Game Play?  
The study did not directly reveal whether the use of game play video AARs would 
increase participation. However, results did show that the players who watched videos 
had more fun than those that did not. This data coupled with the results from the study at 
Fort Bliss where soldiers indicated that the fun level was the most important factor for 
their participation in an ESP game (Vogt et al. 2015). If this data holds true, then one can 
infer that the use of videos would increase participation.  
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The videos also increased the feedback from the soldiers by providing the “why” 
in their decision. Most of what was collected from the players during their ESP game 
session was data that answered “what.” The game was able to determine what tactical 
decision and force structures the players made, but did not tell why they made them. The 
only way to get the answer as to why the players made certain decision was to watch the 
AAR videos. The videos alone provided the context for the various decisions that players 
made during the game. 
c. Will Game Play Video AARs Provide Any Useful Feedback to 
Developers?  
The main purposed of the videos is to capture the context around certain decisions 
made rather than act as a mechanism to capture large amounts of metrics for developers. 
It would be very difficult for developers gather data automatically from the videos. 
However, it may be possible for developers dive into the most watched or best-rated 
videos or videos from the users with the highest score to learn why they are making 
certain decisions. As mentioned earlier, if scenario designers create problems in their 
scenarios that directly address the questions they want players to answer, then the AARs 
will contain information about solving that problem that are useful to the developer. 
Guidelines for how to design scenarios to answer a specific question could be a fruitful 
topic of further research. This thesis shows that AARs would be an effective way to 
capture the necessary data that answers the question. 
d. Will Game Play Video AARs Provide Any Useful Information to Other 
Players and Enhance Their Game Play? 
The information present in the videos did provide useful information for the other 
players and made the game more fun for the players that watched the videos. Every 
player that watched videos said that they would recommend other users watch the videos 
as well. In addition, of the participants that watched videos, 95 percent said that the 
videos affected their mission planning and 55 percent said it affected their in game 
decisions. Additionally, players that watched the videos recorded a statistically higher 
level of fun than the players that played without watching the videos beforehand. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although this study had limitations, it was an overall success. It produced a 
number of takeaways that should be of use to the ESP community. The limitations in this 
study could be easily overcame or mitigated in future studies, especially if future studies 
increase their scope and resources. 
A. LIMITATIONS 
This study had three main limitations that future studies should seek to overcome 
or mitigate. They were the lack of an actual ESP type game, a small sample size, and the 
lack of an actual online gaming community. 
1. VBS3 
While VBS3 was useful for this study, it has its limitations. First, VBS3 is a 
simulation training software designed to train soldiers in collective tasks at the platoon 
and squad level. VBS3 is not a feasible solution for an ESP game because the models in 
VBS3 are not easily changeable. An ESP game will need to offer the players a system 
with changeable design points so that researchers can evaluate the use of the system from 
various configurations as well as its use in various ways. VBS3 may have some limited 
capability to do some configuration changes, but given the resources available for this 
study, we were not able to utilize VBS3 in that manner. In fact, the game only presented 
organizational and tactical options to the players. 
Another limitation in VBS3 is the functionality of the AI. The scenario from the 
experiment required game AI to control some of the forces. Although the researchers 
tested the game scenario through many rehearsals and trial runs with the game’s AI, it 
was impossible to present the AI with every situation possible. Throughout both groups, 
situations arose where the AI did not act in the manner that the players would expect. For 
this reason, the players were informed which team members were AI and which where 
human-in-the-loop. This allowed moderators to manage the players’ expectations since 
the players did not expect the AI to be as responsive as human teammates. 
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2. Sample Size and Participant Demographics 
The amount of time available for this study coupled with resources available did 
not allow for a large sample size. Although 40 individuals participated in the experiment, 
only five sessions were run in each group. This gave a large sample size of participants, 
but a small sample size of sessions and videos to present to the second group. Another 
limitation in the sample size was the number of “gamers” in each group. While the 
moderators sought to balance the teams by how much time each participant regularly 
played video games, ideally the target audience for this type of test should be individuals 
who regularly play video games. When the Army fully develops ESP, soldiers will most 
likely play it on a voluntary basis (Vogt et al. 2015). For this reason, future studies need 
to measure the effects of videos on ESP players who are likely to play ESP games. 
3. Artificiality of the ESP Community 
The main effort of ESP will be the creation and management of an online 
community for players to collaborate and developers to harvest desired metrics (Vogt, 
2016). In this environment, players will most likely create and share videos. Resources 
did not allow for the actual creation of such an environment. In addition, in an ESP 
environment, players who make and share videos will most likely create them on their 
own. In this study, moderators had to walk players through the creation of the videos and 
then edit the videos down so that the second group could watch a variety of videos in the 
time allotted. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As stated earlier, this pilot study provides a baseline for future studies. 
Additionally, it is recommended that future ESP games and communities be designed to 
allow ESP game players to create and share game play videos as well as communicate via 
chat room and message boards to exchange ideas. While the underlying reasons for the 
increase in fun from the videos are still unknown, the data supports the assumption that 
when players play after watching the videos, they have more fun. Since an ESP game will 
already need a collaborative environment for game players to share information with 
capability and material developers anyway, ESP developers should also include an 
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environment where players can communicate with one another as well. This would not 
only allow players to solicit ideas from each other, but also allow developers to 
investigate why players are making the design or usage decisions they are making. 
Additionally, future studies should seek to determine exactly what the underlying reasons 
for the increase in fun from the game play videos was. Two reasons that should be 
explored are (1) game play videos provide more context, and (2) game play videos create 
higher completion rates. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Although this pilot study had some limitations, it provided four key takeaways for 
future ESP studies and ESP developers. First, results suggest that incorporating user 
videos into an ESP community would increase participation as well as increase the fun of 
the game. Second, the data from this experiment indicates that the videos did in fact 
affect the players’ behaviors. Third, every player who watched the videos recommended 
that other users watch the videos as well. Finally, over 70 percent of the participants 
responded that they would create and narrate videos in an ESP game environment. 
The four key findings from the experiment together answer three of the four 
research questions this thesis set out to answer. The lone question that did not have any 
quantifiable data was did the videos provide any useful feedback for developers? This 
question was harder to qualify because the game used in this study was not an actual ESP 
game, and the players who created the videos followed a script to ensure that all of the 
relevant parts of the mission were covered. However, the data that the users presented did 
provide context for the decisions that the players made. Therefore, the videos would not 
provide the “what” to the developers; instead, they would provide the “why” to them. 
This would allow developers to understand the logic behind why players made decisions.  
Although this was a pilot study, the results suggest that there may be some 
positive outcomes to incorporating a video sharing function into the ESP game 
community. In a previous study, researchers found that the number one reason soldiers 
would participate in an ESP game during their time off was fun (Vogt et al., 2015). 
Therefore, if Soldiers are playing in an environment where they can watch videos, this 
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should increase the likelihood that they will participate. However, the ESP community 
will need to monitor the videos and community, both to ensure to the quality of the 
videos presented as well as to prevent groupthink. If players all flock to one way of 
thinking, it may diminish the number of viable prototypes tested. This was evident in the 
Group 2’s red forces use of a heavy machine gun to guard the prison. Once Group 2’s red 
forces learned through the view of the videos that this option was highly successful, 
future users naturally chose it as an option as well. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
This study only scratched the surface of the effects of videos on game play in an 
ESP game and researchers need to conduct future studies before the data from this study 
can assert anything finite. In the future, studies need to increase the participant pool by 
using an online game that allows researchers to solicit participants remotely and allow 
participants to participate on their own time. This may require a less controlled 
experiment, but should vastly increase the number of data points for analysis. This also 
allows the study to get more “gamers” involved. Additionally, any follow on study 
should also have a real online game community where players can share their own videos 
without the use of researchers picking the top videos. This would eliminate the limitation 
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